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EDWARD M. HARRIS
FINLEY’S STUDIES IN LAND  
AND CREDIT SIXTY YEARS LATER
Studies in Land and Credit in Ancient Athens 500-200 B.C.: The Horos Inscrip-
tions was published by Rutgers University Press in 19521 and was re-
printed with a new introduction by Paul Millett by Transaction Books in 
1985.2 The book is unlike Finley’s other books, which were based on lec-
tures.3 The World of Odysseus had its origins in a series of lectures given 
at Bryn Mawr College.4 Democracy Ancient and Modern was based on the 
Mason Welch Gross Lectures given in New Brunswick, New Jersey in 
April 1972.5 The Ancient Economy was the publication of Finley’s Sather 
Lectures given at the University of California, Berkeley in the Winter 
Quarter of 1972.6 Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology was based on four 
lectures presented at the Collège de France in November and December 
1978.7 Politics in the Ancient World was the publication of his Wiles Lec-
tures delivered at the Queen’s University, Belfast in May 1980.8 All of 
these works were written for the general public and address broad, gen-
eral topics in Ancient History: there is little detailed analysis of the an-
cient sources, and the bibliographies in some cases contain few items.9 
By contrast, Studies in Land and Credit focuses primarily on one city 
(Athens) and contains a detailed analysis of Greek texts found on ho-
roi, stone markers used to indicate the presence of a loan or other 
1. Finley 1952. 
2. Finley 1985. 
3. Finley’s other books were collections of essays that had originally been pu-
blished in academic or popular journals (for instance, Finley 1968a, Finley 1975, 
Finley 1981), edited volumes (Finley 1973b, Finley 1976), or general introduc-
tions to broad topics such as The Ancient Greeks (Finley 1963), Ancient Sicily (Finley 
1968b) or Early Greece (Finley 1970). For a bibliography of Finley’s work up to 
1981, see Finley 1981, 312-18. 
4. Finley 1954. 
5. Finley 1973a, ix. 
6. Finley 1973b, 9. 
7. Finley 1980, 10. 
8. Finley 1983, vii. 
9. For instance, Finley 1983 lists only 89 books and articles, of which eleven are 
works by Finley himself. There is no bibliography in Finley 1973a, and Finley 1973b.  
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obligation on land or a building. Finley presented the texts found on 
180 of these horoi in Appendix I of his work. Since some horoi contain 
two texts, there were a total of 182 texts. By coincidence John Fine 
published his Horoi: Studies in Mortgage, Real Security and Land Tenure in 
Ancient Athens as supplementary volume 9 of Hesperia in the previous 
year. This contained forty new texts found on 39 recently found horoi. 
Finley added these new texts in Appendix III of his work to bring the 
total to 222, though not all of the texts are security horoi. 
Studies in Land and Credit contains many of the main views and as-
sumptions that Finley developed at greater length in The Ancient 
Economy, published a little over twenty years later. These ideas were 
considered “the orthodoxy” for many years but in recent years have 
frequently been challenged, if not rejected.10 Despite the growing 
skepticism about Finley’s views on the ancient economy, there has 
been no critical assessment of Studies in Land and Credit in the past 
fifty years.11 Over the past twenty-five years, I have published several 
essays on aspects of real security in ancient Greece and have shown 
that several of Finley’s views about the topic are not supported by a 
careful study of the evidence. This issue of Dike gives me a welcome 
opportunity to present a synthesis of these criticisms, to examine the 
main assumptions underlying Finley’s Studies in Land and Credit, and to 
show how these assumptions led him to present a distorted and ten-
dentious analysis of the evidence.12 Such a study is necessary because 
some scholars still accept some of Finley’s main conclusions.13 Finally, 
10. For Finley’s views on the ancient economy viewed as “the orthodoxy”, see 
Hopkins in Garnsey, Hopkins, Whittaker 1983, x-xi and Morris 1994. For recent 
challenges to Finley’s views about the economy of ancient Greece, see Cohen 
1992, Bresson 2000, Bresson 2007, Bresson 2008, and Harris 2002. For a more 
extensive critique see the essays in Harris, Lewis and Woolmer forthcoming.
11. For reviews of Finley 1952, see Pringsheim (1953), Arangio-Ruiz (1952), 
Berger (1952), Wolff (1953). Pringsheim and Wolff faulted Finley for his lack of 
interest in legal issues, but in general endorsed his views about the role of len-
ding and credit in ancient Athens. 
12. Harris 1988, Harris 1992, Harris 1993, Harris 2008, and Harris 2012a. Harris 
1988, is reprinted in Harris 2006, 163-206, Harris 1993, reprinted in Harris 2006, 
207-40, and Harris 1992, reprinted in Harris 2006, 333-46. In the rest of this essay 
I will refer only to the versions of these essays in Harris 2006. The first two essays 
are not mentioned in the chapters on the economy of Classical Greece in Scheidel, 
Morris, and Saller 2007, 333-406. The main conclusion of Harris 1988, namely, that 
there was no difference between the forms of security described with the language 
of sale and that by the terminology of hypotheke has now been endorsed by several 
scholars and is widely accepted - see Gauthier 1989, 396-7, Todd 1993, 254-5, You-
ni 1996, Hatzopoulos 1991, 59 (“des arguments convainquants [sic]”), Rhodes and 
Osborne 2003, 179, Thür 2008, Walser 2008, 127, note 83, and Game 2008, 17-8 (“E. 
M. Harris a montré qu’il n’existait à Athènes qu’un seul type de sûreté réelle”). See 
especially MacDowell 2004, 68, note 6: “Earlier work [i.e. on the terminology of real 
security] has now been superseded by Harris 1988 and 1993.”
13. For instance, Thür 2008, and Walser 2008, 127, 140, still believe that real 
security in Greek Law was substitutive, not collateral. 
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I believe it is important to take a closer look at Finley’s first book be-
cause many of the problematic (I should say deeply problematic) as-
pects of Finley’s general approach to ancient history are already on 
display: his dogmatism, his cavalier attitude toward ancient texts, his 
tendency to privilege a single piece of evidence and to dismiss, ignore 
or explain away inconvenient evidence, and finally his aversion to ex-
plaining economic activity in the ancient world in terms of markets.14 
Finley’s general analysis of the horoi was built on three main assump-
tions. First, Finley thought that there were three basic forms of real secu-
rity in ancient Athens (hypotheke, prasis epi lysei, and apotimema).15 In this 
regard Finley agreed with Fine and previous scholars though (as we will 
see) differing with him on points of detail.16 Second, Finley believed that 
there were no property records in Classical and Hellenistic Athens.17 Third, 
Finley thought that there were no extensive markets in Classical Athens 
and that as a result the Athenians often did not think in market terms.18 
These basic assumptions influenced several of his main conclusions. 
First, Finley argued that real security in Athenian Law in particular 
and Greek law in general was substitutive and not collateral. This view 
was also not original but went back to Manigk’s article in Pauly-Wis-
sowa.19 In the substitutive form of security, the creditor accepts the 
property as a substitute for the loan if the debtor defaults. The credi-
tor does not view the property pledged as security as a commodity 
that can be exchanged for cash in the market to pay off the debt. He 
is not interested in the cash value of the security but in the security 
as property for his own use. This has two important implications. On 
the one hand, the borrower cannot make further loans on the security 
after pledging it to one creditor. On the other, if there is a difference 
14. Cf. the criticism made by Pringsheim 1953, 226 : “Hier wie oft dringt er 
genau ein, wägt aber nicht ruhig genug ab.”
15. One still finds this mistaken assumption in Maffi 2005, 261-62, who shows 
no awareness of Harris 1988, Harris 1992 and Harris 1993. 
16. See Fine 1951, 61, note 3: “These three forms of real security can be rou-
ghly equated with certain institutions in Roman Law as follows: ἐνέχυρον and 
pignus, ὑποθήκη and hypotheca, πρᾶσις ἐπὶ λύσει and fiducia (cum creditore).” For 
criticism of Fine’s analysis of the differences among the three types of security, 
see Harris 2006, 165-70. Even though they criticized the views of Fine and Finley, 
both Pringsheim 1953 and Wolff 1953 assumed that there were three different 
forms of real security. 
17. Finley 1985, 13-15. 
18. Finley 1985, 116-17. Cf. Goody 2006, 38-48, especially 42: “Taking a Polanyi 
view that the ancient economy was dominated by redistribution (and in this sen-
se was non-modern) leads to an over-riding tendency to downplay anything that 
resembles a market transaction. This is what happens in Finley’s study of the An-
cient Economy in which his effort in this direction, like Polanyi’s was motivated 
by a dislike of the market.”
19. Manigk 1916. This view was anticipated by Pappulias and Dareste. See the 
discussion of their views in Pelloso 2008, 47-49. 
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between the market value of the security and the amount of the loan, 
the borrower does not have a right to the excess, and the creditor 
cannot demand the payment of any deficit. In more general terms, it 
means that the creditor does not view the security as a commodity, 
only as property capable of being transferred to his ownership. 
Second, Finley thought that the practice of real security was confined 
mainly to the wealthy and did not extend to the other members of soci-
ety.20 Third, because Finley believed the use of real security was restricted 
primarily to the upper class, he claimed that there were no laws regulat-
ing the practice of real security.21 Fourth, according to Finley most loans 
were for the purposes of consumption, not for productive uses.22 
In what follows, I shall examine Finley’s first assumption (there 
were more than one form of real security) (Section I), his second and 
third assumptions and his second and third conclusions (Section II), 
and his first conclusion (real security in Athens was substitutive, not 
collateral) (Section III). I am not going to deal with Finley’s view that 
lending was almost exclusively for purposes of consumption because 
other scholars have already drawn attention to the evidence contra-
dicting his view.23 Even Finley’s student P. C. Millett is compelled to 
admit that maritime loans were “apparently productive” and that 
they provide evidence “for productive borrowing in a society suppos-
edly dominated by a profoundly unproductive mentality.”24
I. How Many Forms of Real Security?
Before discussing the views of Finley about real security, it is neces-
sary to say a few words about the horoi that formed the basis of Fin-
ley’s study. The word horos was originally used to denote a boundary 
marker and is used in this sense in the Homeric poems and in Solon’s 
poems.25 Several horoi of this type have been found and dated to the 
20. This view was endorsed by both Pringsheim 1953, 229 and Wolff 1953, 413 
(“sein wichtigstes Ergebnis”). 
21. Finley 1952, 113: “I am convinced that neither the law nor the practice of 
Athenian hypothecation was set by legislative enactment, at least in the fourth 
century B. C. from which most of the material comes.” 
22. Finley 1952, 86-7 (“In sum, when we study land and credit in Athens, the 
normal link between the two all through the classical period, hypothecation, is 
an institution limited largely to men of property acting in non-economic capa-
cities, so to speak.”). 
23. See, for example, Thompson 1982, and Cohen 1990, though I am skeptical 
about Cohen’s claim that banks played a large role in maritime finance. Even 
Finley 1985, 87 had to admit that many of the loans recorded on the horoi were 
productive because they were used “to purchase or improve income-producing 
property.” 
24. Millett 1983, 42, 44. 
25. On the use of the word horos in the Archaic period, see Harris 1997.  
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Archaic period on the basis of their lettering. At some time in the early 
fourth century these horoi started to be used to indicate that the prop-
erty on which they were placed had been pledged as security for some 
obligation. The earliest reference to a horos of this type comes from 
Isaeus’ speech On the Estate of Philoctemon dated to around 364 BCE. 
There are several security-horoi dated by an archonship – the earliest 
possible is dated to the archonship of Chaericleides in 363/2.  In the 
vast majority of cases the horos was placed on property that had been 
pledged as security for a loan. In a smaller number of cases they secure 
the return of a dowry or the payment of rent. The amount of informa-
tion on the horoi varies. Most give the name and demotic of the person 
to whom the property is pledged, and many contain the amount of the 
obligation. The purpose of this kind of horos was to warn third parties 
that there was already a lien on the property. 
To my knowledge, Finley was the first scholar to make a collection 
of all known horoi. When Finley started to work on this project some-
time in the 1940s, Fine had already been given the horoi found in the 
American excavations in the Agora. Fine decided to add a general dis-
cussion of all the security horoi to these documents, but he did include 
previously published horoi. Finley learned about Fine’s work after he 
had already begun his thesis, and contacted Fine, who generously gave 
him the texts of his horoi from the Agora. Finley makes no acknowledg-
ment of this correspondence in his book, but the exchange with Fine 
was crucial in Finley’s developing the appendices of sources that are 
perhaps the most useful feature of Studies in Land and Credit.26 
Fine augmented Finley’s collection for the biggest of three classes of 
horoi (all described in some detail immediately below). For horoi with 
the “sold on condition of release” vocabulary, Finley had gathered 92, 
and Fine gave him 22 more. Fine did not add any in the smaller cat-
egories of horoi described as “lying under an obligation” or described 
as “mortgaged.” Since the work of Finley and Fine, Paul Millett added 
14 more horoi of the first class in his second edition of Studies in Land 
and Credit in 1985. A check of Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum re-
veal around 42 additional security horoi published since that date. The 
work of Finley and Fine laid the basis for the study of these documents, 
which I hope to advance farther by gathering all the known horoi, in-
cluding numerous examples as yet unpublished, in a new collection.
The division of labor between Finley and Fine reflected circum-
stances at the time.  Fine was able to see the stones whereas Finley 
could not. Finley did not have the funds to travel to Greece (as far as I 
know), and there was a civil war in Greece from 1946 to 1949 (though 
that would not have prevented access to the finds in the Agora). For 
this reason, Finley relied on Fine’s readings of the new horoi in the 
26. The late A. Raubitschek informed me of this exchange between the two 
men. Pringsheim 1953, 230 predicted that Finley’s collection would hardly “all-
gemeine Billigung und Anwendung finden,” but his prediction did not prove to 
be correct. 
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class of “sold on condition of release.” Finley, in turn, made the first 
collection aiming at completeness, which, as revised by Millett, still 
remains the standard reference work. 
Perhaps the most perplexing feature of the horoi is the terminology 
used for real security.27 On just seven horoi, we find the term hypokei-
menou, -es, -on, which we can translate “lying under an obligation.” 
On a much large number of horoi, 128 in the collection of Finley and 
Millett, we find a different kind of expression: pepramenou, -es, -on  epi 
lysei, which is often translated as “sale on condition of release.” On 
roughly fifty horoi we find a third type of expression, either the noun 
apotimema in the nominative or genitive or the perfect passive parti-
ciple: apotetimemenou, -es, -on. In the literary sources we find a fourth 
term for real security, enechyron, which is not found on the horoi (D. 
33.10; [D.] 49.2, 52, 53; 56.3). 
The traditional view of this terminology was that prasis epi lysei 
equated with fiducia cum creditore in Roman Law, hypotheke equated 
with hypotheca, and enechyron with pignus. This view originated with 
Hitzig in 1895 and was followed by Beauchet in 1897, by Lipsius, and 
by Fine in his Horoi, published in 1951. To understand the meaning of 
this, we need to review the meaning of these terms in Roman Law.28  
1) fiducia cum creditore – Ownership (dominium) is transferred to the cred-
itor by mancipatio or cessio in iure. The borrower may remain on the 
property at the will of the creditor (precario).  This form of security was 
usually employed for immovables. The creditor and the debtor might 
conclude pactum de vendendo setting terms for the sale of the security. 
2) hypotheca – The borrower retains both ownership and possession. 
The creditor gains nothing more than a lien on the property. The 
borrower has the right to contract additional loans on the property. 
If there are several loans, the creditors are ranked according to the 
principle prior tempore, potior iure. 
3) pignus – The borrower retains ownership (dominium), but the credi-
tor gains lawful possession (possessio). If the borrower attempts to 
regain possession of the security, this is considered theft. This form 
of security was usually employed for movables (pawn). 
Fine developed a theory that prasis epi lysei was the earlier institu-
tion and hypotheca the later institution.29 He based this theory on the 
assumption that in earlier periods the law tended to favor the creditor 
while in later periods it favored the borrower. Since in prasis epi lysei 
the borrower did not have the right to make further loans on the same 
27. On the three basic terms, see Harris 2006, 163-64, 206-9. 
28. For a brief account with references to the sources, see Schulz 1951, 406-7. 
29. Fine 1951, 90-93. 
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security it must have been the earlier practice. Since in hypotheke the 
borrower could make additional loans on the same security, it must 
have been the later practice. The fatal problem with this theory is that 
the terminology of hypotheke for real security occurs earlier than the 
language of sale for real security.30 
Finley discussed each of the terms for real security in separate 
chapters, but his analysis is very vague. In his analysis of the security 
transactions in Demosthenes’ speech Against Pantaenetus, he cannot 
identify any specific differences among the three types of security: 
Essentially, then, the speech deals with a series of manoeuvers 
and deals in the field of security, not genuine sale. Though con-
veyance of the property occurs and recurs over his head, Pan-
tainetos remains in continuous possession and control as long as 
he meets the interest payments and the mysterious unidentified 
terms of the agreement. When he defaults, the creditors take the 
security as forfeit; this they would have done whether the trans-
action was called prasis epi lysei or hypotheke or apotimema.31 
Finley saw (rightly as it turns out) that “prasis epi lysei was not a 
genuine, complete sale” and that “its outward form, then, is sale, the 
essence hypothecation.”32 This formulation is very elegant and epi-
grammatic, but it explains absolutely nothing about the difference be-
tween prasis epi lysei and hypotheke.33 All Finley could suggest was “the 
hypotheke was somehow more flexible than the prasis epi lysei and lent 
itself more readily to special terms and conditions, hence the more 
frequent need to commit the agreement to writing.”34 He then haz-
arded a guess about the origin of prasis epi lysei: 
The reasons for the creation of such a mixed institution (...) will 
be found historically in the rise of security transactions in the pe-
riod where free alienability of landed property was difficult and 
socially as well as legally restricted, juristically in the problems 
of execution after default and in the need for a device that would 
strengthen the creditor’s right to evict the debtor and that would 
protect the new owner’s claim to the property.35 
30. For detailed criticism of Fine’s theory, see Harris 2006, 165-70. 
31. Finley 1985, 33-4.
32. Finley 1985, 35.
33. Cf. Wolff 1953: “er aber unerklärt läßt, was er damit meint.”
34. Finley 1985, 24.
35. Finley 1985, 35. 
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Again we encounter the same vagueness. Finley does not explain 
how the institution was “mixed” nor how it helped to overcome these 
alleged obstacles to alienability and execution. Furthermore he never 
specifies what these obstacles were. Finally, in an essay published in 
1968 Finley actually contradicted himself by showing that there were 
no major restrictions on alienability in early Greece.36 
Even though Finley noted the difficulties in identifying any key dif-
ferences between prasis epi lysei and hypotheke, he did not question the 
basic assumption shared by all scholars writing on the subject that the 
Athenians possessed two or three forms of real security. Scholars had 
observed that in Roman Law there were three basic forms of security 
and therefore assumed that the different terms used to describe real 
security in Greek must refer to different types of real security. But Fin-
ley and other scholars did not take into account the reasons why the 
Roman legal system could make a clear distinction among different 
forms of real security. Unlike the case in Athenian law, Roman law pro-
vided formal procedures for conveyance (mancipatio and cessio in iure) 
and also created one legal procedure to protect ownership (dominium), 
namely, the vindicatio, and another to protect legitimate possession 
(possessio), namely, the possessory interdict. These procedures made it 
possible to differentiate among three forms of real security. In the first 
form, fiducia cum creditore, the creditor gained ownership of the secu-
rity through a formal transfer of ownership (mancipatio). In the second 
form, hypotheca, the creditor gained neither ownership nor legitimate 
possession but only a lien on the security, which he could then seize 
in the event of the borrower’s default. In the third form, pignus, the 
creditor gained legitimate possession (possessio) but not ownership (do-
minium) of the security when the borrower handed it to him. The law of 
Athens and other Greek city-states did not have formal modes of con-
veyance like the mancipatio and did not create formal procedures for 
protecting legitimate possession as opposed to ownership. This meant 
that Athenian law had no procedural mechanisms for creating distinc-
tions among different types of real security.37
Several pieces of evidence show that from a legal perspective there 
were no differences between the transactions involving real security 
expressed by the term hypotheke and its related verbs and those denot-
ed by the language of sale. First, Pollux (Onomasticon 8.142) explicitly 
equates the two terms. The lexicographer observes that in his speech 
Against Chares Hyperides uses the term “selling” (ἀποδόμενος) instead 
of the term “pledging as security” (ὑποθείς). This indicates that he re-
garded the two terms as virtual synonyms, not as terms denoting dif-
ferent forms of real security.38 Second, on one horos (Finley-Millett no. 
36. Finley 1968c.
37. On these points, see Harris 2006, 174, 198-99. 
38. Finley 1985, 224, note 11 attempted to explain away the evidence of Pollux, 
but, see Harris 2006, 190, note 68. Pelloso 2008 takes no account of this passage, which 
is key evidence against his view that there were two different kinds of real security. 
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80A and 81A) one finds two inscriptions about real security. Instead of 
using the language of hypotheke or the language of sale, the two inscrip-
tions combine the language of the two standard formulas (80A, lines 
2-3: ὑποκειμένης | ἐπὶ λύσει and 81A, lines 2-3: ὑποκειμέν[ης] | ἐπὶ λύσει). 
One cannot argue that this is a mistake because there is no sign that the 
inscriber attempted to correct the mistake; in fact, he repeated the for-
mula. There are alternative ways of interpreting the expression: first, 
this denotes a third kind of real security, which is attested nowhere 
else in our sources; or second, that there was no essential difference 
between the transactions denoted by the different formulas, making it 
possible to combine elements from both. The first explanation is highly 
improbable; the second is supported by the statement of Pollux indicat-
ing that the two formulas referred to the same form of security.39 
Third, the terminology of hypotheke and the terminology of sale for 
real security are used interchangeably in the records of the poletai for 
the year 367/66 BCE.40 The records for this year include the confisca-
tion of property owned by Theosebes, who was accused of impiety, fled 
into exile, and was condemned in absentia. Before the poletai sold his 
property, three sets of creditors came forward to ask for repayment of 
loans made to Theosebes on the security of his property. The first loan 
was made by Smicythus of Teithras, to whom Theosebes’ house had 
been pledged for a loan of 150 drachmas (lines 14-15: ὑπόκειται). The 
second loan was made by Kichonides of Gargettos and the koinon of 
the Medontidai phrateres, to whom the house had been “sold” (line 23: 
ἀποδομένο) for a loan of 100 drachmas (lines 16-25). Since Kichonides 
clearly did not claim that the house belonged to him, this line must 
refer to a loan on security. The final loan, this one for 24 drachmas, 
was made by Aeschines of Melite and a koinon of orgeones, who had also 
“bought” the house (lines 33-4: πριαμένων... ἡμῶν) (lines 30-35). In 
each case, the loan only creates a lien on Theosebes’ property. Despite 
the language of sale used to describe two of the transactions, they did 
not create a conveyance because other loans were made on the same 
security and recognized as valid by the poletai.41 What is striking for 
the question of terminology is that the two formulas for real security 
are used interchangeably. 
Fourth, the two formulas are also used interchangeably in the works 
of Demosthenes. When describing his father’s estate, Demosthenes says 
that it included slaves pledged as security for a loan of forty mnai (D. 
39. Cf. Harris 2006, 174-75. 
40. The inscription was originally published in Crosby 1941, 14, no. 1. The 
inscription has been republished in Rhodes and Osborne 2003, no. 36. 
41. Pelloso 2008, 77-78, note 154 claims that only the claim of Smicythus was 
considered valid and that “le altre due vendite erano da considerarsi invali-
de.” But this assertion is contradicted by the language of the inscription, which 
clearly indicates that both claims were in fact considered valid (lines 25, 34-5: 
ἔδοξεν ἐνοφείλεσθαι). This undermines much of Pelloso’s argument that there 
were two different types of real security. 
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27.9: ὑποκειμένους. See also D. 27.24). Later on in the speech, however, 
we learn that Demosthenes’ guardians made another loan on the secu-
rity of the same slaves (D. 27.27). This would indicate that the type of 
security called hypotheke did not transfer ownership to the creditor but 
only created a lien on the property. In the speech Against Pantaenetus, 
the speaker Nicobulus recounts how he and his partner made a loan of 
105 mnai to Pantaenetus on the security of a workshop and thirty slaves 
(D. 37.4).42 Throughout the speech, Nicobulus uses the language of sale 
to describe the pledge of security (D. 37). Yet Nicobulus later tells us 
that there was another set of creditors on the same security (D. 37.13-
15).43 Even though Nicobulus casts doubts on their claims, he never ar-
gues that their lien was not binding because Pantaenetus’ property had 
already been sold to them. The use of the language of sale is therefore 
misleading in this speech: although Pantaenetus claims that he had 
“bought” the property of Nicobulus, the latter was still able to make 
loans on the security of the same property in exactly the same way that 
Demosthenes’ guardians made further loans on the same security.44 
The evidence reveals that Pollux was correct in viewing the terms 
“pledging as security” (ὑποθείς) and “selling” (ἀποδόμενος) as virtual 
synonyms. There is no reason to believe that the Athenians (or other 
Greeks) had two or more forms of security, one called hypotheke, the 
other prasis epi lysei. As we saw before, their legal conceptions and 
procedures did not allow them to make the same kinds of distinctions 
between different kinds of real security as were made in Roman law.45 
Finley realized that there were differences between Athenian law and 
Roman law, but this insight did not lead him to question the basic 
assumption made by previous scholars about real security in Greek 
law.46 In this regard, Studies in Land and Credit was a conservative work, 
which did not break new ground.
42. For detailed analysis of the transactions in the speech, see Harris 2006, 
190-99. 
43. Pelloso 2008, 73, 75 only looks at the language of sale in D. 37.4 but does 
not notice that Pantaenetus also pledged the workshop and the slaves as security 
to other lenders and that Nicobulus deals with these creditors as if their claims 
were valid. This shows that Pelloso’s view that the pledge of security in this case 
was an actual sale is wrong. This evidence also demonstrates that we must not 
interpret the language of sale too literally at D. 33.8, a passage on which Pelloso 
2008, 72-3 places much weight. 
44. Note that Nicobulus contrasts the “sales” of the security by Pantaenetus 
to his creditors with his later actual sale of the workshop and slaves (D. 37.31) 
by adding the term kathapax to mark the latter sale as different from the former. 
Pelloso 2008, 71-77 does not notice this passage and the contrast with D. 37.4, 
which undermines his argument that there was a distinction between two types 
of security. 
45. The term apotimema does not refer to another kind of real security pace Finley 
1952, 43-46, but is a general term for real security that is found not only in loan tran-
sactions but also in dowry agreements and leases - see Harris 2006, 207-40. 
46. For the differences, see Finley 1985, 8. 
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II. Property Records and Market Activity
The two most influential assumptions for Finley’s study of the horoi 
were that extensive markets did not exist in Classical Athens and that 
the Athenians did not keep written records about property transactions. 
Finley did not discuss markets in Studies in Land and Credit, but his view 
that real security was substitutive depends heavily on his conception of 
markets, a subject in The Ancient Economy.47 At the end of the first chap-
ter of this later book, Finley states (without citing any ancient sourc-
es) that the level of the specialization of labor was not high enough to 
create extensive inter-regional markets. On the basis of this assertion, 
Finley then omitted the terms “market” and “market-exchange” from 
the remaining chapters of The Ancient Economy. Recent work however 
has shown that the level of specialization was much higher than Finley 
assumed. For Athens alone, there is evidence for over 170 different oc-
cupations, which led to the creation of a permanent market in Athens, 
where prices were determined by supply and demand.48
Finley was not alone in believing that the Greek city-states did not 
maintain documents about the ownership or property. This was a 
widespread assumption in 1952, and most scholars (myself included) 
accepted it in the following decades.49 In two path-breaking essays 
published in 1997 and 2000, however, Michele Faraguna showed that 
there is much evidence for property records both in Athens and in 
other Greek city-states.50 In the Politics Aristotle says that one of the 
regular offices found in a community is one having responsibility for 
records about property: “Another superintendency connected very 
closely with this one is the supervision of public and private proper-
ties in the city, to secure good order and the preservation and recti-
fication of falling buildings and roads, and of the boundaries between 
different persons’ properties, so that disputes may not arise about 
them, and all the other duties of supervision similar to these” (Ar. 
Pol. 1321b18-23). The purpose of these records is not to help the state 
to collect taxes but to make it easier to resolve disputes between in-
dividuals, in other words, to secure the rights of private owners.  In 
another passage Aristotle (Pol. 1331b6-11) stresses the need to main-
tain records about legal relationships between individuals and court 
47. See in particular his assertion that in calculating the value of the sla-
ve making he inherited from his father, Demosthenes did not think in market 
terms. Finley 1985, 116-17. 
48. For occupations and the existence of permanent markets in Athens, see 
Harris 2002. For retail occupations outside Athens, see Ruffing 2008. 
49. Note however that Wolff 1953, 420 drew attention to the Theophrastus 
fragment about the hekatoste, which I discuss below.
50. Faraguna 1997 and Faraguna 2000. For a recent study, see Game 2008. Frier 
and Kehoe 2007, 135-36 appear to be unaware of Faraguna’s important studies (“the 
Greeks and Romans generally lacked the systematic public registries that are ne-
cessary for conclusive resolution of disputes over ownership, boundaries, land use, 
servitudes, liens; adequate resources and bureaucracies were simply unavailable”). 
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decisions, which could be used as evidence in court to prove title. An 
entry in the lexicon of Hesychius (s.v. ἐν λευκώμασι) reports: “It was 
customary to register pieces of land and slaves sold on white boards, 
and they wrote on tablets of box-wood smeared with white clay the 
names of the properties and the slaves and those who purchased them 
so that if anyone wished, he could safely make a charge when he saw 
the white board.” This gives the impression that the practice of keep-
ing records of sales was widespread. 
At Athens sellers provided advance written notification of a sale, 
and buyers might pay a tax of 1% (hekatoste) as a kind of registration 
fee. As Theophrastus (Theophrastus fr. 21 (Szegedy-Maszak) [= Sto-
baeus 4.2.20]) says, “Some say that there should be advance written 
notification with a magistrate no fewer than sixty days before as at 
Athens and that the buyer should deposit one percent of the price 
so that whoever wishes to may raise a protest and lodge an objec-
tion and so that it may be clear by virtue of the payment who is the 
legal purchaser.” To provide documentation, the poletai kept records 
of these payments, which provided the name of the seller, the name of 
the buyer and a brief description of the property.51 These records are 
clearly not similar to modern property registers, which are organized 
by place with each property given a set of coordinates on a grid. They 
are records of a tax paid for a sale and serve as accounts for magis-
trates, the poletai, who had to report on public revenues at the end 
of their term of office. But by recording that the payment was made, 
these records could be used to prove ownership and therefore fulfilled 
one of the main functions of modern property registers. 
The records of payment of the one-percent tax were not the only 
documentation of sales. The poletai also kept records of properties 
that had been confiscated and sold to new owners.52 The most famous 
example is a set of records for the property confiscated from those 
who were convicted of impiety during the affair of the desecration 
of the Herms and the parody of the Mysteries in 415.53 These records 
do not give a helpful description of the land that is sold, but the re-
cords of the property sold after being confiscated from the Thirty in 
403/2 are more informative.54  There is the name and demotic of the 
person who reported the property, followed by the verb “reported” 
(ἀπέγραφεν) and by the property and the owner. The neighbors on the 
north and the south are given, then name of the buyer, and the surety 
who promises to pay the remaining amount of the price if the buyer 
does not. In the left-hand margin is the price of the property and the 
amount of the sales-tax. 
51. For the texts of these inscriptions, see Lambert 1997, 5-74. 
52. For the records of the poletai, see Langdon in Lalonde, Langdon and Wal-
bank 1991, 58-60. 
53. See IG i3 421-430. 
54. On these records, see Walbank 1982.
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This kind of document served several purposes. First, it was a finan-
cial document, which recorded the revenue gained by the state from 
the sale and from the sales tax. In this regard it served to keep pub-
lic officials, the poletai, accountable.55 It also recorded the name of the 
surety who pledged to pay the purchase price if the buyer did not. But 
the document also provided evidence of the owner’s title. The method 
of describing the property is very crude (only the deme and the names 
of the neighbors), but it should have been sufficient to identify its lo-
cation. Another example comes from the records of the poletai for the 
year 367/6, discussed in the previous section. These records include 
the confiscation and sale of a house belonging to a certain Theosebes 
of Xypete located at Alopeke.56 These records are more detailed and 
give the deme of the property as well as its borders: a road leading to 
the sanctuary of Daedalus, the sanctuary itself and the neighbor to the 
south, Philippus of Agryle. The records of the poletai were located at 
Athens, but there may have been other records located in the demes.57 
All this evidence was available to Finley, but he chose not to pay at-
tention to it. This is not the minor oversight that it might appear to be. 
As Hernando de Soto has recently shown, the existence of public re-
cords to prove title are important for economic development. In a soci-
ety where such records do not exist, transfers of land tend to move in 
a restricted circle of neighbors, family and friends. In a society where 
public authorities maintain such records, land tends to be transferred 
among a much wider group and expands the market in land. The ex-
istence of such records also encourages owners to view their land as 
a commodity that can be moved on the market. Finally, such records 
provide documentation of ownership, which in turn makes it possible 
for small landholders to obtain credit. As de Soto observes, 
Any asset whose economic and social aspects are not fixed in a 
formal property system is extremely hard to move in the market….
Without such a system, any trade of an asset, say a piece of real es-
tate, requires an enormous effort just to determine the basics of the 
transaction: does the seller own the real estate and have the right to 
transfer it? Can he pledge it? Will the new owner be accepted as such 
by those who enforce property rights? What are the effective means 
to exclude the other claimants?58
We can see these processes at work in Attica during the Classical pe-
riod. First, the hekatostai records and the confiscation records reveal 
that many who purchased land came from outside the deme in which 
the property was located and were not family members.  Second, many 
55. For the examination of accounts presented by officials after their term of 
office, see Arist. Ath. Pol. 54.2 with Rhodes 1981, 597-99. 
56. For the text, see Lalonde, Langdon and Walbank 1991, P5, lines 8-39. 
57. On property records kept in the demes, see Faraguna 1997, 23-28. 
58. de Soto 2000, 45. 
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lenders mentioned on the horoi come from outside the deme.  Both cir-
cumstances show credit relations did not just move in the restricted 
circle of family, friends and neighbors.59 Finley had this evidence be-
fore him, but did not compare the addresses of buyers and creditors 
on the one side, and properties on the other. 
The horoi also reveal that credit on security was available to farmers 
of modest means. In the collection of horoi made by Finley and supple-
mented by Millett in 1985, there were 135 concerned with loans on real 
security. As we noted in section I, there are two kinds of expression used 
to indicate real security. The median value of the loans using the hy-
potheke terminology is 750 dr., and that for the prasis epi lysei terminol-
ogy is 1,100 drachmas.60  For both groups the median is therefore around 
1,000 drachmas. These are relatively low figures: we should keep in mind 
that those in the liturgical class, which was probably about 1,200 of the 
citizen population in the fourth century, had at least three talents or 
18,000 drachmas and in most cases much more.61 Probably over three-
quarters of the male citizens in Attica owned property. There are also 
sixteen loans for 500 dr. or less. This reveals that even those with a small 
amount of land could still obtain access to credit. This would tend to con-
firm the anecdotal evidence found in Aristophanes’ Clouds (1178-1200) 
that the demos, that is the non-elite part of the population, was in debt. 
This evidence, which Finley compiled himself and supplemented by his 
student Millett, completely undermines one of his main conclusions. 
Because Finley believed that most lending was confined to the elite 
and credit was not widely available (despite the abundant evidence 
of the horoi), he assumed that there were no laws about real security, 
which allegedly reflected the low level of economic development. This 
is Finley’s second conclusion in my list. Finley overlooked three key 
passages that prove him wrong.62 First, Isaeus (10.24) states that the 
person in possession of a disputed property was compelled to bring 
forward either the seller or the person who pledged the property as 
security, or to demonstrate that the property had been awarded to 
him by a legal judgment. This shows that Athenian law placed the 
person who acquired a property through a pledge of real security on 
the same footing as someone who acquired it by sale or by a court 
judgment. It therefore recognized the right of a creditor to acquire 
a property from a borrower after default. Second, the law provided a 
private action, the dike exoules, for the creditor against a debtor who 
had pledged his property as security and refused to yield possession. 
59. For the evidence, see Harris forthcoming. This seriously undermines the 
analysis of lending and borrowing by Millett 1991, a student of Finley. 
60. See Millett in Finley 1985, xx-xxi. New security horoi have been published 
since 1985, but they do not appear to change these figures. 
61. For the size of estates owned by those in the liturgical class, see Davies 
1971, xx-xxii. 
62. For analysis and discussion of these three laws, see Harris 2006, 234-39. 
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The evidence for this procedure is found in an entry in Harpocration 
(s.v. ἐξούλης), who cites several sources. 
The name of a private action that those who claim that they have 
been excluded from their property bring against those who exclude 
them….Those who do not receive (the money) before the relevant 
deadline also bring actions for the payment of penalties….Those who 
are convicted on a charge of exoule give the winner of the suit what 
they took away from him and also pay the treasury the assessed pen-
alty. The creditor who was attempting to take possession of property 
belonging to a debtor, but was prevented by someone, also used to 
bring a private suit for ejectment.63 
This law recognized therefore the right of the creditor to take pos-
session of a property pledged to him as security. 
The third law is paraphrased twice in Demosthenes’ speech Against 
Spudias (41.7-10). Polyeuctus had given his daughter in marriage to the 
speaker but not paid the entire dowry. He therefore pledged a house 
as security for the remainder. When Polyeuctus died, the speaker took 
possession of the house, but Spudias attempted to prevent him from 
collecting the payment of rent on the house. The speaker then cites a 
law that forbids those who have pledged a property as security from 
making a claim on it once the creditor has taken possession. Previous 
law granted the creditor the right to take possession of a security, but 
this new law protected the creditor against any claims made by the 
debtor or his heirs after he has taken possession. 
Finley cites all three of these passages in Studies in Land and Credit, 
but when discussing legislation about credit and real security in the 
sixth chapter of his book, ignores them.64 
III. Substitutive vs. Collateral Security
Finley’s view that real security in Athens was substitutive and not 
collateral, his first conclusion in my list, was closely connected with 
his view that the Athenians did not think in market terms, his second 
main assumption. His view that real security at Athens was substitu-
tive rested mainly on the account Demosthenes gives of his father’s 
estate in his first speech Against Aphobus (D. 27.9-11). Finley (1985) 116 
63. ὄνομα δίκης ἣν ἐπάγουσιν οἱ φάσκοντες ἐξείργεσθαι τῶν ἰδίων κατὰ τῶν 
ἐξειργόντων…..δικάζονται δὲ ἐξούλης κἀπὶ τοῖς ἐπιτιμίοις οἱ μὴ ἀπολαμβάνοντες 
ἐν τῇ προσηκούσῃ προθεσμίᾳ,…. οἱ δὲ ἁλόντες ἐξούλης καὶ τῷ ἑλόντι ἐδίδοσαν ἃ 
ἀφῃροῦντο αὐτόν, καὶ τῷ δημοσίῳ κατετίθεσαν τὰ τιμηθέντα. ἐδικάζετο ἐξούλης 
καὶ ὁ χρήστης κατέχειν ἐπιχειρῶν χρῆμα τοῦ χρεωστοῦντος καὶ κωλυόμενος ὑπό 
τινος.
64. Finley 1985, 228, note 33, 233, note 51 cites Is. 10.24; Finley 1985, 245, note 
61, 296, note 20 cites D. 41.7. Though Finley cites several passages from Harpo-
cration’s lexicon, I can find no reference to the entry on ἐξούλης. 
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quotes the passage, then notes that Demosthenes’ “arithmetic is hope-
lessly inaccurate.” He then continues: 
For the slaves who made cutlery, Demosthenes indicates, in 
a rough way, a market price. It is uncertain whether this was 
the price his father actually paid or what the slaves would have 
brought if they had been sold at the time the elder Demosthenes 
died, but it is a genuine price in either event. For the twenty bed-
makers, however, he gives the size of the debt which they se-
cured, and this figure is correlated with the actual price of the 
other group of slaves. That the bedmakers were worth more on 
the market than the amount of the debt is obvious. Yet Dem-
osthenes, who is seeking to show the magnitude of his inherit-
ance and hence the great wealth of which he has been robbed by 
Aphobus, does not think of re-calculating the value of the twenty 
slaves in market terms.
Now comes the epigrammatic conclusion of this passage, which I 
have cited partly as an example of Finley’s style in this book:
His father had received them against a loan of forty minas, and 
forty minas was to be their figure forevermore. The idea of hy-
pothecation, like the reality, was purely substitutive.65 
If we accept Finley’s view, there is a problem with Demosthenes’ 
arithmetic. He gives the value of slaves making cutlery as five or six 
mnai each, none worth less than three mnai (D. 27.9-11).66 This points 
toward an average value of five mnai each and a total of two talents, 
forty or forty-five mnai in total. Later Demosthenes says that the 
value of the productive assets in the estate, that is, the slaves making 
cutlery, the slaves making beds, and a talent loaned at interest was 
four talents, fifty mnai. The slaves making beds must be worth more 
than the 40 mnai of the loan. But if we assume that Demosthenes 
put the market value of these slaves at sixty-five or seventy mnai, 
the arithmetic works very well. One should note that in the rest of 
the passage there is nothing wrong with Demosthenes’ arithmetic. 
Finally, if we calculate the value of the bed-makers at 65-70 mnai 
the annual income of 12 mnai is a return on investment of roughly 
18%, which is comparable to the return on investment for the slaves 
in the cutlery shop (30 mnai a year on an investment of 160-5 mnai). 
There is nothing wrong with Demosthenes’ arithmetic – the problem 
lies with Finley’s assumption about the substitutive nature of real 
security.
65. Finley 1985, 116. 
66. For detailed analysis of the passage, see Harris 2006, 179-81. For an analysis 
of Demosthenes’ father’s estate, see Harris 2002, 81-83. 
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Because Finley assumed that there were no extensive markets, he 
also assumed that the Athenians could not conceive of land and other 
kinds of property as commodities. This in turn led him either to ig-
nore or to explain away the following seven pieces of evidence for 
collateral security in Athens and other Greek cities.67 
1) D. 28.18
 To where would we turn if you should vote for any other verdict? To 
the property pledged as security to our creditors? But that belongs 
to them. To the excess (resulting from the sale of the security)? But 
that belongs to him if we owe the epobolia.68
Demosthenes brought a private suit against his guardians for mis-
managing and embezzling his inheritance. In this passage he tells the 
judges that if they vote against him, he will not have any property left. 
He claims that he has pledged most of his property as security to his 
creditors for loans contracted to pay for liturgies and other expenses. 
Demosthenes states that should his creditors seize and sell this prop-
erty, he would still have a right to the excess (περιόντα) from which 
he can pay Aphobus the epobolia for losing his suit. The epobolia was a 
penalty of one-sixth the amount claimed in a private suit for plaintiffs 
who lost their cases.69 Demosthenes therefore assumes that he will 
have a right to any difference between the sale price of the security 
and the amount of his obligation to his creditors. If real security in 
Athenian law was substitutive, Demosthenes would not have a right 
to any excess.
2) D. 33.10
 After stationing men to guard the ship, I told the whole story to the 
sureties of the bank and turned the security over to them, telling them 
that the foreigner had a lien of ten mnai on the ship. Having arranged 
this, I attached the slaves, in order that, if any shortage occurred, the 
deficiency might be made up by the proceeds of their sale.70
67. In an essay published the year after Studies in Land and Credit, Finley 1953, 
recognized that the loans recorded in the poletai records for the year 367/6 do 
provide examples of collateral security but tried to dismiss them as exceptional. 
This inscription was published by Crosby in 1941 and is mentioned by Finley 
1952, 111-13, but Finley strangely enough did not mention its implications for 
his ideas about substitutive security in that work. Wolff 1953, 424-25 noted that 
Finley’s views about multiple creditors created problems for his view that real 
security was substitutive. 
68. ποῖ δ’ ἂν τραποίμεθα, εἴ τι ἄλλο ψηφίσαισθ’ ὑμεῖς περὶ αὐτῶν; εἰς τὰ 
ὑποκείμενα τοῖς δανείσασιν; ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑποθεμένων ἐστίν. ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰ περιόντα 
αὐτῶν; ἀλλὰ τούτου γίγνεται, τὴν ἐπωβελίαν ἐὰν ὄφλωμεν.
69. On the epobolia, see MacDowell 2008. 
70. καταστήσας δὲ φύλακας τῆς νεώς, διηγησάμην τοῖς ἐγγυηταῖς τῆς τραπέζης 
τὴν πρᾶξιν, καὶ παρέδωκα τὸ ἐνέχυρον, εἰπὼν αὐτοῖς ὅτι δέκα μναῖ ἐνείησαν τῷ 
ξένῳ ἐν τῇ νηί. ταῦτα πράξας κατηγγύησα τοὺς παῖδας, ἵν’ εἴ τις ἔκδεια γίγνοιτο, τὰ 
ἐλλείποντα ἐκ τῶν παίδων εἴη.
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This passage comes from the speech Against Apaturius. The speak-
er tells how Apaturius had failed to make repay a loan and was being 
pressed by his creditors, who were about to seize his ship. Parmeno, a 
friend of Apaturius, consented to lend him ten mnai, which he borrowed 
from the banker Heracleides, and asked the speaker to contribute thirty 
mnai. Parmeno then quarrelled with Apaturius and asked the speaker to 
assume full responsibility for the loan. The speaker drew up an agree-
ment in which he listed himself as creditor for ten mnai. The speaker 
however does not consider the ship as equivalent to the debt (substi-
tutive security) because he envisages the possibility that the proceeds 
from the sale of the ship might not cover the entire loan. In this case, 
he would be entitled to ask for the shortfall from Apaturius (collateral). 
3) IG ii2 2670 = Finley (1985) no. 146. 
 Marker [of a property] pledged as security for the dowry of Hip-
pocleia, the daughter of Demochares of Leuconoion, 1 talent.  The 
excess value has been pledged to the Kekropidai, the Lukonidai, and 
the Phleians.71 
4) Hesperia Suppl. 7 (1943) 1, no. 1 = Finley (1985) no. 147, lines 1-7. 
 Marker of a house pledged as security for the dowry of Eirene (?), 
daughter of Antidorus of Leuconoion, 1,000 drachmas.  The excess 
value have been pledged as security to Aglaotime for 200 drachmas, 
and to the Gephyraioi for 200 drachmas...72
In both of these arrangements, there is an implicit agreement that 
the security would be sold in case of default and the excess of the 
amount over the amount of the first lien would be given to the other 
creditors. In others words, this presupposes a forced sale, not joint 
ownership by the creditors. Once more, even though the security is 
already pledged to one set of creditors, the borrower still has the right 
to pledge the difference between the amount of the first loan and the 
market value of the security to another creditor. The property is not a 
substitute for the debt but serves as collateral. 
5) SIG3 976, lines 64-68 – Law about Grain from Samos – 200-150 BCE
 If any of the borrowers does not pay back the money either the en-
tire sum or a part, let the Chiliastys sell the security (hypothema). If 
there is an excess amount, let him return it to the person who gave 
the security. If there is a deficit, let him collect it from the person 
who provides the security.73
71. ὅρος χωρίο προικὸς | Ἱπποκλείαι Δημοχά|[ρ]ος Λευκονοιῶς Τ· | [ὅσ]ωι 
πλείονος ἄξι|[ον] Κεκροπίδαις | [ὑπό]κειται καὶ Λυκ|[ομί]δαις καὶ Φλυεῦ|[σι].
72. ὅ[ρ]ος οἰκίας ἀποτε[τιμ]|ημένης προικὸς Ε[ἰρη?]|νεὶ ’Αντιδώρου 
Λευ[κονοι]|έως θυγατρὶ X δρα[χμῶν]| ὅσωι πλέονος ἀξία ἐ[τιμήθ]|η ’Αγλαοτίμει 
ὑπόκε[ιται] | HH καὶ Γεφυραίοις HH [...] 
73. ἐὰν δέ τις τῶν | δανεισαμένων μὴ ἀποδιδοῖ τὸ ἀργύριον ἢ πᾶν ἢ μέρος τι, 
τὸ ὑπόθεμα ἀποδόσθω ἡ χιλαστύς, καὶ ἐάν τις ὑπεροχὴ γένητα[ι], | ἀποδότω τῶι τὸ 
ὑ|πόθεμα δόντι. ἐὰν δέ τι ἐνλίπῃ, τὴν πρᾶξιν | ποιησάσθω ἐκ τοῦ ἐγγύου. 
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This law indicates that in the event of default a public official will 
sell the security. If the sale brings in an amount larger than the debt, 
the debtor has the right to the excess. On the other hand, if the pro-
ceeds from the sale are less than the amount of the loan, the debtor 
must pay the shortfall. Once more, the security is not a substitute for 
the loan but is viewed as a commodity that has a cash value. The credi-
tor is interested not in gaining ownership of the property but in the 
cash value of the property. 
6) SIG3 672, lines 64-72 – Decree of Delphi – 162-160 BCE 
 If they do not pay back in accordance with what has been recorded, 
let their securities belong to the city, and the Overseers who made 
the loans have the power to sell them. If the securities once they are 
sold do not provide the money (i.e. the loan) for which they were 
pledged to the city, let the borrower and his sureties be liable to the 
Overseers for the remaining sum (which they can collect) in any 
way they wish to collect, in the same way as they do with other  
public and temple money.74
As in the law from Samos, the security is not viewed as a substitute 
for the loan, but as providing cash from its sale. The debtor has the 
right to the excess. In both of these laws there is a forced sale carried 
out by public officials.
7) SIG3 364, lines 32-41 – Law of Ephesus about Debt (early third cen-
tury BCE)
 All those who have lent money on the surplus (of property already 
pledged as security) can recover their money from the excess, 
whether there is one (creditor) or are more (than one), the first 
(lenders) and the others in that order. If some have given property 
to others as security when borrowing money from others making 
them believe that this property is unencumbered and deceive the 
later lenders, it is permitted for the later lenders to exchange places 
with the previous lenders taking into consideration the Common 
War and take possession of the property. But if there is still some-
thing owing to them, the lenders have the right to recover from 
all the property of the borrower in whatever way they can without 
incurring any penalty.75
74. εἰ δέ κα μὴ ἀποδι|δῶντι καθὼς γέγραπται, τὰ ἐνἐχυρα αὐτῶν τᾶς πό|λιος 
ἔστω, καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ ἀεὶ οἱ ἐγδανείζοντες κύρ[ι]|οι ἔστωσαν πωλέοντες· εἰ 
δὲ πωλείμενα τὰ ἐνέ|χυρα μὴ εὑρίσκοι τὸ ἀργύριον ποθ’ ὃ ὑπέκειτο τᾶι πόλει, 
πρά|κτιμοι ἔστωσαν τοῖς ἐπιμεληταῖς ἀεὶ τοῖς ἐνάρχοις τοῦ | ἐλλείποντος ἀργυρίου 
αὐτός τε ὁ δανεισάμενος καὶ | οἱ γενόμενοι ἔγγυοι, τρόπωι ὧι θέλοιεν πράσσειν, 
καθὼς | καὶ τἆλ[λ]α δαμόσια καὶ ποθίερα πράσσονται.
75. ὅσοι δὲ ἐπὶ | τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι δεδανείκασιν, εἶναι τὴγ κομιδὴν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ 
περιόντος μέρους τῶι | γεωργῶι, κἂν εἷς κἂμ πλείους ὦσι, τοῖς πρώτοις πρώτοις 
καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπεξῆς, τὸν δὲ | [νό]μον εἶναι καὶ τούτοις καθάπερ καὶ τοῖς πρώτοις 
δανείσασιν; εἰ δέ τινες | [ὑποθέ]ντες ἄλλοις κτήματα δεδανεισμένοι εἰσὶμ παρ’ 
ἑτέρων ὡς ἐπ’ ἐλευθέροις | [τοῖς κ]τήμασι, ἐξαπατήσαντες τοὺς ὑστέρους δανειστάς; 
ἐξεῖναι τοῖς ὑστέροις | [δανεισ]ταῖς ἐξαλλάξασι τοὺς πρότερον δανειστὰς κατὰ τὸν 
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Here again, the creditor has the right to demand any deficit be-
tween the price obtained by the sale of the security and the amount 
of the obligation. 
In all these passages it is taken for granted that the security can 
readily be converted into cash. In an economy where there were per-
manent markets in most communities, that should come as no sur-
prise.  This evidence also confirms one of de Soto’s insights about the 
role of property records in enhancing the economic potential of as-
sets. When one records the ownership of a house or land in writing, 
one starts to think about the object as an economic asset. What was 
formerly viewed as a place to live or to grow crops becomes something 
which can produce value either as collateral for a loan or as equity 
that can be exchanged in the market.76 
Conclusion
A careful analysis of the basic assumptions and main conclusions 
of Studies in Land and Credit reveals it to be a deeply flawed work. Al-
though it contains a useful collection of texts, its approach is based 
on three assumptions that recent research has shown to be incorrect. 
These assumptions in turn influenced his main conclusions, several of 
which are not supported by the evidence Finley himself assembled in 
Appendix I and Appendix III of his work. It is ironic that Finley, who 
so often scolded other scholars for selective use of evidence, did not 
examine his own appendices when studying the horoi. It is also ironic 
when, in his discussion of the nature of social relations in the Attic 
countryside, he cites Wilamowitz, not Marx or Weber.77 Studies in Land 
and Credit is in some respects a conservative work, almost timid; it 
does not question many traditional views about the subject. The views 
that there were two or three forms of real security in Greek Law, that 
there were no property records and that real security was substitu-
tive, were all staples in the scholarly literature long before 1952.
The same is true of much of Finley’s later writing. His views about the 
role of slavery in the Homeric poems and the late Archaic period owe 
much to the work of E. Meyer and his own teacher W. L. Westermann.78 
Much of the analysis in The Ancient Economy draws extensively on the 
work of M. Weber and J. Hasebroek. Many of his comparisons between 
Ancient Greece and the Near East rely on assumptions (now generally 
συλλογισμὸν τοῦ κοινοῦ πο|[λέμου] ἔχειν τὰ κτήματα. ἐὰν δὲ ἐνοφείληταί τι αὐτοῖς 
ἔτι, εἶναι τὴγ κομιδὴν τοῖς | [δανειστ]αῖς ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τοῦ χρειστοῦ πάσης, 
τρόπῳ ᾧ ἂν δύνωνται, ἀζημίοις | [ἁπάση]ς ζημίας.
76. On the advantages of property records, see de Soto 2000, 47-62. 
77. Finley 1952, 27 with 220, note 86. It is amusing to note that in his review of 
Studies in Land and Credit Pringsheim 1953, 224 faulted Finley for not heeding the 
views of Max Weber about the relationship between law and economy. 
78. For Finley’s debt to E. Meyer, see Harris 2012b. 
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rejected) about “the Asiatic mode of production,” one of Marx’s less 
successful ideas and Polanyi’s views about the economy of the ancient 
Near Eastern, now widely rejected.79 One can view much of The World of 
Odysseus as an attempt to popularize the ideas of K. Polanyi about gift-
giving. And his view that Solon abolished debt-bondage, now shown to 
be untenable, was a traditional one shared by many scholars.80 
The time has come for a new study of the security horoi and of real 
security in the law of Athens and other Greek poleis. This study should 
contain a collection of all published horoi with readings based on autopsy 
and with an attempt to record the find spots of all the stones (something 
Finley did not do in a systematic way).81 The analysis of the horoi must also 
place the legal analysis of real security in its proper historical context, 
that is, in a society that had extensive written records documenting sales 
and ownership of land and markets in commodities, land and credit.82 
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